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Intractable Policy Failure: the Case of Bovine TB and Badgers 
The failure to eliminate bovine TB from the English and Welsh cattle herd represents 
a long-term intractable policy failure.   Cattle-to-cattle transmission of the disease 
has been under emphasised in the debate compared with transmission from badgers 
despite a contested evidence base.  Archival evidence shows that mythical 
constructions of the badger have shaped the policy debate.   Relevant evidence was 
incomplete and contested; alternative framings of the policy problem were polarised 
and difficult to reconcile; and this rendered normal techniques of stakeholder 
management through cooption and mediation of little assistance.    
 
This article examines an intractable, long-term policy failure: the inability to eradicate 
bovine tuberculosis from the English and Welsh cattle herd as is required by the 
European Union (EU).   If success is defined, as it has been by the Department of 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra,) in terms of slowing down and 
preventing the spread of the disease to areas free of it and achieving a sustained 
reduction of the disease in high incidence areas, ‘then it is uncontroversial to claim 
that successive badger control policies have failed.’   (Macdonald, Riordan and 
Matthews, 2006, 131).   Part of the problem arises from a lack of agreement on the 
relevant evidence and gaps in that evidence, leading to uncertainty about the 
appropriate course of action to deal with the problem, in particular whether culling of 
badgers should occur.    
       This article does not focus primarily on the evidential problem.   (For a 
discussion, see Wilkinson 2007).  Rather it suggests that the absence of an expert 
consensus creates a challenge for evidence-based policy making given that a situation 
in which the evidence is contradictory is worse than one in which there is no 
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evidence.   The resultant policy vacuum allows greater play to arguments which are 
not evidence-based but often rely on emotional appeals based on particular values or 
images.   The emotional sensitivity of the policy area is often referred to by civil 
servants in government papers.    
        ‘Intractable policy controversies exist and are fundamental to the policy-making 
process … Frame analysis helps us to account for their origin and stubborn survival’.    
(Schön and Rein, 1994, 56-7).    This article considers the ways in which the disputes 
about bovine TB policy have been framed and how this affects their resolution.   In 
summary, the argument advanced is this: relevant evidence was incomplete and 
contested; alternative framings of the policy problem were polarised and difficult to 
reconcile; and this rendered normal techniques of stakeholder management through 
cooption and mediation of little assistance.    
     Depoliticisation narratives would suggest that issues of this kind can be more 
expediently handled by transferring them away from ministers and policy civil 
servants to agencies can be the first line of defence against criticism, the Chemicals 
Regulation Directorate and pesticides offering a good example within Defra.    
However, this has not proved possible in the case of bovine TB.   Whilst Defra has 
effectively ended its involvement in other endemic cattle diseases such as Johne’s 
disease and the bovine diarrhoea virus, both of which have substantial effects on 
productivity and animal heath, it has had to maintain a substantial team of civil 
servants to deal with bovine TB.    The expertise which government has sought to 
utilise to find solutions to the policy problem has itself become politicised. 
       Archival evidence from the National Archives extending up to the early 1990s is 
used to show that particular constructions of the badger have had a shaping influence 
on the debate.   The relaxation in practice of the 30 year rule meant that it was 
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possible to view files up to 1992.    The files are extensive and appear to be a 
complete sequence.   It is never possible to tell whether and how files have been 
weeded, but there is material in the files that would be embarrassing from a 
government perspective. 
       The discussion provides a contribution to the debate on government and policy 
failure.   Some of the existing literature on government failure does not fit particularly 
well with cases that involve animals.    Conventionally, that involves a calculation of 
whether a policy outcome is Pareto inefficient in the sense that Pareto efficiency 
provides society with a utility possibility frontier where an individual cannot be made 
better off without another being made worse off.   Human individuals are able to 
make assessments about whether they or others are better or worse off, but in relation 
to animals this founders on the question of whether animals as ‘sentient beings’ can 
be counted as individuals or as members of society.   ‘The recognition that animals 
are sentient is held to mean that we have direct moral obligations towards them, and 
not their owners or those seeking to represent their interests.’   (Garner, 2008, 111).   
However, the argument presented here has a more general applicability beyond this 
special set of cases and the debate about the legal status of animals.     The literature is 
replete with examples of where rent-seeking behaviour by particular interests has 
produced distorted and suboptimal policy outcomes.    However, another important 
case is where the politicisation of an issue by strongly opposed interests of relatively 
equal weight leads to policy paralysis.  Government resorted to a number of familiar 
devices to unblock the policy impasse, such as reviews by advisory committees and 
even constituted a special body which lasted for over thirty years in an attempt to 
reconcile the opposed interests.   Although policy modifications resulted from these 
efforts, the underlying problem remains unresolved. 
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Government failure and policy failure 
Besley notes that (2007, 45), ‘Government failure is a term that is often used but 
rarely defined.’    In this discussion, policy failure is treated as a subset of government 
failure.   Typical government failures such as the suboptimal provision of public 
goods necessarily lead to policy failure.   However, one needs to be cautious about 
how far an approach based on a model derived from welfare economics, which 
predominates in the government failure literature, can help us to understand the 
politics of policy failure.   As Besley has pointed out (2007, 25), ‘it has tended to say 
little about the process of policy choice and implementation.  To that extent it gives a 
highly technocratic perspective.’    The argument made here is that intractable policy 
failure in the form of policy paralysis needs to take account of the way in which the 
debate about the policy problem is constructed and even the pictorial depiction of 
symbols which is a highly effective way of appealing to deeply held values.    The 
approach taken in this article is influenced by Woods (2004) in her history of foot and 
mouth disease (FMD) in Britain.  Her argument is that FMD was transformed from an 
inconsequential ailment to a terrible animal plague by a range of social, economic, 
scientific and, above all, political forces.   Understandings of FMD were 
manufactured and it became ‘an ideological affair that was closely bound up with the 
role and status of science in society, the accountability of government bodies and 
Britain’s international standing.’ (Woods, 2004, 101). 
      Dunleavy (1995, 52) suggested that Britain was ‘a state unusually prone to make 
large-scale, avoidable policy mistakes.   The most generally used label for this 
category is “policy disasters”, generally construed to mean significant and 
substantially costly failures of commission or omission by government.’    Moran 
(2001) seeks to relate the problem of policy catastrophe to the phenomenon of the 
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regulatory state.   He poses the question, ‘Why is the age of the regulatory state also 
the age of policy catastrophe?’ and one answer he provides are that ‘Catastrophes are 
due to the incomplete penetration of the regulatory state.’   (Moran, 2001, 415).   He 
distinguishes between five types of catastrophe, one of which is ‘symbiotic politics’ 
which he illustrates with the case of BSE, drawing attention to the tightly knit policy 
community that developed in agricultural policy with its inbuilt productionist 
priorities that led to the husbandry practice that produced BSE.     
       The case of bovine TB was somewhat different in so far as the reluctance of the 
National Farmers’ Union (NFU) to get involved in the issue was complained about by 
officials and the NFU’s influence was counter balanced by organisations purporting to 
represent the badger.    Moran concludes (2001, 426) that ‘Symbiotic politics holds 
the most imponderables for the regulatory state.    The case of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) and BSE shows the extraordinarily 
destructive consequences of fusing public institutions and private interests.’    In the 
case of bovine TB, policy-makers sought to involve a much wider range of interests 
than those of farmers.   However, the result was not the dogged pursuit of perverse 
and counter productive policies, as in the case of much of what emerged from the 
traditional agricultural policy community, but no effective or consistent policy at all. 
        It could be argued that there are some policy solutions that are intractable in the 
sense that no solution is available.   The term ‘failure’ might be seen to imply that 
policy solutions are available which policy makers have failed to identify and 
implement.  Current government policy places reliance on the development of a 
vaccine for bovine TB.   A vaccine administered by injection will be available soon, 
but that poses the problem of catching badgers to administer it which is difficult.   An 
oral vaccine which could be administered with bait is still some way away.    It is 
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suggested later in the article that there is an interim policy strategy which, although 
carrying some political costs, would reduce the extent of failure compared with 
current policy. 
The development of policy 
                                         [Insert Table 1 near here] 
A brief chronology of the development of policy is set out here (Table 1) to inform 
the subsequent discussion.  The original driver for government involvement in the 
eradication of Bovine TB was a public health concern, although high levels of 
infection of cattle were also a factor with as many as 30 per cent of cattle in Britain 
dying from the disease in the early 20th century.   In the 1930s some 2,000 deaths a 
year were attributed to bovine tuberculosis derived from cows’milk. This particular 
route of infection was overcome by pasteurisation (except where raw milk was 
consumed), although transmission could offer through an aerosol effect to someone in 
contact with infected animals.    Bovine TB is therefore no longer a major zoonosis, 
but this has not diminished political interest in the subject. 
      By 1960 it was widely believed that bovine TB had been brought under control in 
the British cattle herd.   Complete eradication may not be achievable but ‘between 
1960 when the whole country became an attested area and the end of 1964, the 
incidence of reactors had fallen from 19 in 10,000 to 6 in 10,000.’  (Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 1965, 227).   Subsequently, the badger population 
increased while the end of the Attested Herds Scheme removed a constraint on the 
movement of cattle from infected herds to those that were uninfected.    
        Bovine TB was discovered in a badger for the first time in 1971 and badger 
culling began in 1975.   ‘In 1975 MAFF was presented with the unenviable task of 
controlling badger-transmitted TB in cattle in the almost total absence of any relevant 
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research on the biology of any relevant research on the biology and control of 
badgers.   Badger control tactics have changed in response to public relations needs 
… but the strategic principles on which the tactics are based have hardly changed 
since their inception.’   (NA: PRO, MAF 459/119, 1986, 12).   It is arguable that 
initial responses relied too heavily on a perception of the badger as the problem and 
hence the focus of any solution.   The submission to the minister made in May 1974 
referred to ‘the disquieting circumstances in which badgers were linked with the 
upsurge of bovine tuberculosis in the South West.’   (NA PRO: 459/37, 1985a, 3).   
MAFF documents referred to ‘The most intractable animal disease problem’ as 
‘badger-borne tuberculosis.’  (NA PRO: MAF 459/12, 1983).  It is only since the mid-
2000s that faced ‘with scientific evidence which confirms the importance of cattle-to-
cattle transmission, the NFU,  the British Veterinary Association (BVA) and other 
farming organisations have been forced to accept the necessity of cattle based control 
measures.’  (Wilkinson, 2007, 13). 
      In 1979, the incoming Minister of Agriculture, Peter Walker, established a review 
of policy chaired by Lord Zuckerman which endorsed existing policy.    (Zuckerman, 
1980).  There was always provision for a follow-up review to Zuckerman, generally 
referred to by civil servants as ‘son of Zuckerman’, and this appeared as the Dunnet 
Report in 1986.  (Dunnet, 1986).    This recommended a scaling down of culling, the 
so-called ‘interim strategy’.    This remained in place for ten years, despite criticism 
from both farmers and conservationists, in part because attention switched to the 
problem of BSE which constrained the resources available for dealing with bovine 
TB. 
       In 1996 the Government commissioned a new independent review of policy 
chaired by Professor John Krebs.    This report recommended a programme of 
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experimentation to determine whether badgers were responsible for the spread of 
bovine TB in cattle and whether culling strategies would reduce its incidence.   The 
Independent Scientific Group on Cattle TB was set up by the Government in 1998 to 
conduct the Randomised Badger Culling Trial (RBCT) in order to establish the effects 
of badger culling on the incidence in herds of bovine TB.    This led to the 
contradictory reports and the Defra secretary, Hilary Benn, decided not to proceed 
with a cull.   Whilst a cull might work, ‘it might also not work’ and would be too 
risky.   One factor he took into account was that public opposition would render a cull 
more difficult.   (Stocks, 2008, 6). 
        Thus, nearly forty years after the first tuberculosis diseased badger carcass was 
found, there is still no settled policy to tackle the problem.   This is partly a question 
of the lack of a scientific consensus which allowed mythologies to develop, as in the 
case of the ‘old rogue badger’ discussed below.   It was not surprising that civil 
servants meeting in the Badger Steering Group discussed options such as ‘”let’s do as 
little operational work as possible which we continue to try to discover more clearly 
what we should be doing”’.   (NA PRO: MAF 459/12, 1982, 2).   In practice, badger 
control was ‘influenced by practical and political expediency, field experience, 
research, public relations considerations, the perplexities and imponderable nature of 
TB badger/cattle relationships and much discussion among interested parties, 
especially the views of veterinarians whose primary concern, rightly, is the health and 
welfare of cattle.’  (NA PRO: MAF 459/19, 1986, 12).   
The problem of evidence 
This section sets out the costs that arise from attempts to manage bovine TB.   It 
shows that there has been a lack of scientific evidence, or agreement on the 
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interpretation of the scientific evidence, which makes it difficult for policy-makers to 
arrive at decisions on how the disease should be tackled. 
        
       The persistence of bovine TB at a time when there is increased concern about the 
security of food supplies is undermining the livestock industry at a time when it is 
beleaguered by rising fuel and feed costs.    Exports can suffer when cattle are sent to 
countries that are free of the disease.   Dutch farmers imposed a ban on live cattle 
exports from Britain after calves imported in 2008 tested positive for bovine TB and 
Belgian farmers also refused to take British calves and cattle.    Culling animals 
involves emotional and financial costs to farmers, particularly where pedigree herds 
built up over many years are involved.    The public expenditure costs of dealing with 
bovine TB are substantial and have been increasing.    40 per cent of the Animal 
Health Agency’s resources are devoted to dealing with TB, currently around £100m a 
year.   Government estimates suggest that the total annual expenditure on TB could 
increase to over £300m a year by 2012-13.   ‘This would mean that the total 
expenditure on cattle TB between [2008] and 2013 would be approximately £1 
billion.’   (House of Commons, 2008, 12).   At a time when public expenditure has to 
be cut in response to the recession, Treasury pressure for the reduction of expenditure 
that does not secure desired outcomes is bound to increase. 
        ‘Critical gaps in the knowledge about cattle TB and the way it spreads remain.’  
(House of Commons, 2008, 4).   There is substantial evidence that badgers contribute 
significantly to the disease in cattle, but ‘The evidence is … mainly of a 
circumstantial nature, proving that infected badgers can cause infection of cattle, that 
infected badgers can shed significant amounts of infectious material, that cattle may 
interact with badgers in real situations.’   (House of Commons, 1998, 14).   However, 
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‘what is still not known is the precise method of transmission from badger to cattle, 
i.e. it is still not known whether direct contact is necessary for the transmission of the 
disease.’   (House of Commons, 2008, 10). In addition, ‘The role and extent that 
cattle-to-cattle transmission plays in the maintenance and spread of TB is unknown.’   
Moreover, ‘Current tests for bovine TB in cattle are not completely reliable.  Tests for 
TB in badgers and other wildlife are less reliable.’   (Welsh Assembly, 2008, 2).   
        Could badgers be catching TB from the cattle?   This issue is certainly raised in 
the scientific literature.    There is discussion about whether badgers are acting as 
‘spill over’ hosts (i.e., that badgers become infected from cattle but do not disseminate 
it) or ‘reservoir’ hosts (i.e., badgers become infected and maintain the infection and 
can pass it back to cattle at some point in the future).  What is still unclear is whether 
badgers are ‘maintenance’ hosts, i.e., whether TB can remain in the badger population 
indefinitely without continual exposure to infection from cattle. 
         The lack of any consensus among scientific experts is shown by two contrasting 
reports commissioned by the Government.     The final report of the Independent 
Scientific Group (200, 14) stated, ‘we conclude that badger culling cannot 
meaningfully contribute to the future control of cattle TB in Britain.’    The 
Government then commissioned a review of the ISG’s report by the then Government 
Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir David King, assisted by a group of five experts.   The 
King Group concluded that ‘In our view a programme for the removal of badgers 
could make a significant contribution to the control of cattle TB in those areas of 
England where there is a high and persistent incidence of TB in cattle, provided 
removal takes place alongside an effective programme of cattle controls.’  (King, 
2007, para. 5) 
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       Apart from this contradictory advice, a further complication for policy-makers is 
that there is evidence of a perturbation effect when badgers are culled.   Put at its 
simplest, this means that the disrupted social groups disperse and relocate.    
Moreover, ‘perturbation increases incidence of bTB in badgers’ and ‘can cause the 
spatial distribution of bTB in badgers to change from one in which it is contained 
within spatially discrete patterns of high prevalence to one where it is more widely, of 
thinly spread.’   (Macdonald, Riordan and Matthews, 2006, 286).   Thus, ‘to have any 
prospect of contributing significantly to controlling bTB in cattle, a badger cull would 
have to be undertaken over a very large area.’   (Macdonald, Riordan and Matthews, 
2006, 268).    Given the level of emotional attachment to the badger, such a large-
scale cull would be highly politically unpopular. 
. 
Constructing the badger: the myth of the old rogue badger 
The badger is an omnivorous mammal which is the largest surviving land carnivore in 
the British Isles, following the extinction of the wolf and the bear.   It has lived in the 
islands for at least a quarter of a million years. Around a quarter of the population is 
estimated to be concentrated in the south-west of England and only ten per cent in 
Scotland.    It is a largely nocturnal animal with poor eyesight.  It is estimated that 
there are some 300,000 badgers in Britain and it is not an endangered species, 
although it receives strong legal protection.    Cultural constructions of the badger in 
literature and elsewhere treat it as a cherished species endowed with elements of 
magic and mystery. 
        Perhaps it was the very mysteriousness of the badger, and the lack of real (as 
distinct from self-proclaimed) experts on the badger that led to the development of the 
myth of ‘the old rogue badger’ which had a significant and continuing influence on 
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public policy.    The concept of the ‘rogue badger’ is still present in frames of 
reference as it was referred to in a discussion between the author and the Defra bovine 
TB team in May 2009. The myth of the rogue badger permitted the construction of an 
image of a bad, deviant or anti-social badger, a ‘senile and virtually toothless’ (NA 
PRO: HO 285/39, 1965) creature, whose actions could be presented as a basis for 
intervention against a cherished animal.    This was only possible by asserting that 
there were very few rogue badgers.    The categorisation could not be extended to the 
much larger number of badgers afflicted with TB. 
      Prior to the discovery of bovine TB in a badger carcass in 1971, the Ministry of 
Agriculture had generally taken a benevolent view of the badger: ‘On the whole, the 
badger is generally regarded as a friend of the farmer since it has some beneficial 
effect in its destruction of many harmful insects and other pests.’    However, no 
quarter was to be shown to an old rogue badger that had been demonstrated to have 
been responsible for damage: ‘we recommend that it should be shot by an expert 
marksman when emerging from its sett at dusk.’   (NA PRO: MAF 131/170a, 1965).    
Such a drastic measure was necessary because it was believed that it could not be 
easily trapped.   ‘The so-called “rogue” badger is less afraid of such things [traps] 
than other members of his species and, of his accusers are to be believed, will push 
through the small pop-hole entrance to a hen-house.’   (NA PRO: HO 285/40a, 1966)    
This was somewhat at odds with the characterisation quoted earlier of the rogue 
badger as a senile animal, but it was the orthodoxy rather than its internal consistency 
that seemed to be important. Anyone deviating from the departmental line was likely 
to draw a sharp rebuke from Animal Health Division.   Commenting on a draft 
ministerial reply, a civil servant in the division stated, ‘because of the activities of 
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“rogue” badgers, we could not say that badgers are not harmful.’   (NA PRO: MAF 
285/40b, 1966).  
        One of the difficulties was that these issues were being dealt with by generalist 
civil servants and even when they sought the advice of specialists such as the 
Infestation Control Laboratory at Worplesdon, they were advised that ‘Very few 
scientific investigations have been made of the life and habits of the badger and all 
but one or two of these have been uncritical and superficial.   The literature abounds 
with conflicting theories’.   (NA PRO: MAF 131/170b, 1960).    Nevertheless, within 
the Nature Conservancy, which was then the official advisory body on flora and 
fauna, officials shared among themselves their doubts that the ‘rogue badger’ really 
existed: ‘Between ourselves, I find the reference to “rogue” badgers puzzling.  Do we 
know that such a creature exists or is it merely that badgers (along with other species) 
are likely to become opportunists when the occasion arises?’   (NA PRO: FT 4/184, 
1965).  However, the Nature Conservancy Council was more of an external advocate 
than an internal adviser in the policy process and did not see fit to challenge the 
established orthodoxy.  Indeed, they were characterised as ‘unhelpful’ in one policy 
review document.  (NA PRO: MAF 459/37, 1985a, 7). 
Symbolism and discourse 
As Schön and Rhein note (1994, 34), ‘In order to reflect on the conflicting frames that 
underlie policy controversies, we must become aware of our frames, which is to say 
we must construct them’.  Quite apart from the problems created by fictional creations 
like the rogue badger becoming embedded in the understandings of policy-makers, the 
politics around badgers invokes a highly charged discourse which takes visual as well 
as written forms.    Such symbolic representations can be an important element in 
political discourse.   ‘Every symbol stands for something other than itself, and it also 
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evokes an attitude, a set of impressions, or a pattern of events … associated through 
imagination with the symbol.   The symbols discussed here are ‘Condensation 
symbols [which] evoke the emotions associated with the situation.’  (Edelman, 1964, 
6).   They may contribute to ‘an injustice frame, a way of viewing a situation or 
condition that expresses indignation or outrage over a perceived injustice, as well as 
finding some human agency to blame for that transgression.’  (Jasper, 1998. 414). 
        A picture in Farmers Weekly showed the badger, red in tooth and claw, 
devouring its prey, a strong contrast to the images used by animal welfare groups 
found in the National Archives..  The Dartmoor Badger Protection League (‘formed to 
prevent the unjustified slaughter of badgers’) shows two badgers gambolling happily 
in a sylvan setting.   An organisation called Brock has a more soulful picture, with a 
rather anthropomorphic badger looking out wistfully from behind the bars of a cage.    
The National Federation of Badger Groups has two badgers in a supplicant stance 
below the organisation’s name.  
          These pictorial descriptions were matched by the language used in the debate 
by stakeholder organisations and interested individuals.     The badger is depicted in 
highly positive terms as an innocent victim, whilst public policy is portrayed in highly 
negative terms.    Terms such as ‘cruel’, ‘slaughter’ and ‘extermination’ are frequently 
deployed to describe government policy.   Civil servants were aware that this was an 
area of great public controversy which entailed the involvement of Mrs Thatcher as 
prime minister.  They emphasised ‘that we in the Ministry of Agriculture dislike 
having to take action against the badger.  It gives us as much revulsion as it gives our 
critics.’   (NA PRO: MAF 459/20, 1984).    What this represents is an instance of 
parties to a policy controversy seeing ‘issues, policies and policy situations in 
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different and conflicting ways that embody different systems of belief and related 
prescriptions for action’.  (Schön and Rhein, 1994, xviii). 
                                           
Stakeholder groups and the policy context 
Relations with stakeholder groups in the area were very difficult in spite of the 
prevalent British policy style of seeking to consult and work with a range of interests.  
In some quarters of MAFF, particularly among those with scientific backgrounds, 
there was deep suspicion of conservationist groups because of their lack of scientific 
understanding and their perceived lack of openness to argument: ‘I would suggest that 
very few local naturalists and conservationists will have much to contribute on badger 
social groups.’   (NA PRO: MAF 459/14, 1985).   There was a concern that badger 
organisations might be ‘wholly comprised of “cranks”’.   (NA PRO: MAF 459/26, 
1984).   Nevertheless, they were perceived as potentially formidable adversaries who 
had an ‘anticipated reactions’ effect on policy over a long period of time   An 
advisory leaflet on keeping badgers and cattle apart had a restricted distribution 
because ‘It might … attract criticism from the conservation lobby who might accuse 
us of overstating the role of the badger.’  (NA PRO: MAF 459/52, 1991)  There was 
concern that ‘Conservation interests could renew their attack at any time’.  (NA PRO: 
MAF, 1983b). There was what a major review document characterised as the 
‘mounting pressure from pseudo environmental pressure groups (EPEGs).   (NA 
PRO: MAF 459/37, 1985, 1).     The Ministry faced ‘a steady increase in pressure via 
MPs through a variety of ad hoc bodies such as “Brock” whose pronouncements have 
been hostile and downright misleading’: 
            There is now a minority of persons prepared to intervene physically in 
            badger control organisations … It is difficult to foresee this pressure 
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            diminishing.   Given the increased militancy of animal rights’ organisations 
            it may increase … It is possible that any major confrontation would stimulate 
            a whole series of such confrontations for a longer or shorter period.   This 
            factor can no longer be dismissed as irrelevant for practical purposes.   (NA 
            PRO: MAF 459/37, 1985, 7-8). 
           Apart from a constant concern that any action to protect badgers might provoke 
the fields sport societies, the Ministry also considered that they were undermined by a 
lack of support from their most important interest partner, the National Farmers’ 
Union (NFU): 
           Over the years [the NFU] have adopted a very low profile and have not 
           attempted to defend the policy.  Following the publication of the Dunnet  
           Report they did not even issue a press statement … It is not going to be easy 
           for MAFF to adopt a high profile if the NFU adopts a very low one.   It was 
           only by a squeak that the Minister was not undermined by the NFU on 
           hormones policy because of a similar divergence in PR effort.  (NA PRO: 
           MAF 459/37, 1985b, 3) 
Following the publication of the Dunnet Report, MAFF pointed out to the NFU that 
‘for a considerable period MAFF has borne criticism for its badger control policy – 
action aimed at supporting the livelihood of NFU members who are livestock 
producers.’    Disappointment and ministerial criticism was expressed to the NFU but 
the hope that the NFU ‘will, however belatedly, now take up its cudgels on behalf of a 
policy which benefits its members’ produced no response.   (NA PRO: MAF 459/39, 
1986). This continued to be a problem in the early 1990s, a memorandum noting that 
NFU representation on the Badger Panel ‘has been weak’.   (NA PRO: MAF 459/66, 
1992a.) 
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      A further challenge was media criticism of government policy.   ‘Badger control 
has never had a good press since it was first mooted’.    The Ministry was particularly 
aggrieved by what it considered to be ‘provocative television broadcasts by Mr Phil 
Drabble.’    (NA PRO: MAF 459/37, 1985b, 1).    Lord Arran expressed the hope on 
television that ‘My only wish is that if the Minister proves to be wrong then he’ll be 
eaten by badgers as Bishop Hatto was eaten by rats’.  (BBC, 1975).   The print press 
was also highly critical.    A not untypical report was one that appeared in the Sunday 
Times with the strapline ‘Farmer’s wife Phyllis Crook weeps as ministry men pump 
cyanide gas into a badger sett in Lyneham, Wilts’ accompanied by an appealing 
picture of a badger.  The article opened, ‘Badgers are being wiped out in south-west 
England because of an official report [the Zuckerman report] which is now being 
widely attacked as scientifically spurious, biased and factually misleading.’   (Grice 
and Gillie, 1980).   In 1982 a strategy of actively defending the policy was initiated by 
the then minister, Peter Walker, but ‘Although considerable resources went into the 
exercise there was no discernable effect on the volume of hostile criticism.’  (NA 
PRO: MAF 459/37, 1985b, 2). 
 
Defusing the issue: the advisory committees 
Given the intractability of the issue, ministers resorted to a number of devices to seek 
advice and to try and reconcile opposing interests.   External advisory committees 
were one such device, in this case committees headed by Lord Zuckerman and 
Professor Dunnet     The prevailing atmosphere made appointments to head the 
various advisory committees and panels set up in the policy area particularly 
challenging, requiring special qualities of those appointed.   ‘It may not be easy to 
find someone with the appropriate qualities who is prepared to take on a task which is 
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likely to make him a new target for extreme critics of our badger control policy.’  (NA 
PRO: MAF 459/16, 1987a,  2).    In relation to what became the Dunnet review, the 
prime minister, Mrs Thatcher, was advised, ‘the individual concerned could well 
become the target of persona abuse as Lord Zuckerman was … All members should 
be able to tolerate some criticism given that the subject is one raising considerable 
emotion in some quarters.’  (NA PRO: MAF 459/22, 1984, 2).    Dunnet was, 
however, more successful than the combative Lord Zuckerman in developing a policy 
stance that defused the issue for a decade   
      The Zuckerman committee, which reported in 1980, was set up by Peter Walker 
shortly after he became minister in response to criticism of departmental policy on 
badgers and TB.    Lord Zuckerman was a distinguished individual who proved to be 
broadly supportive of existing policy, arguing that ‘Half-measures or measures taken 
without an understanding that the situation we are facing is a TB epidemic of serious 
proportions in badgers, are not going to succeed’.   (Zuckerman, 1980, 42).   He did, 
however, stir up controversy with his robust criticisms of badger organisations 
        The 1986 Dunnet Report re-affirmed the badger/cattle link in bovine TB, but 
recommended restricting badger control to the farm of breakdown.   This had the 
advantage of killing few badgers and also reduced the demands on public expenditure.   
This was becoming increasingly important with ‘pressure for financial savings on 
ADAS expenditure and a need for numerical savings on posts’.  (NA PRO: 459/37, 
1985b, 1).   The Dunnet Report ‘was, in the absence of adequate scientific 
information, obliged to be pragmatic and to compromise in its conclusions and 
recommendations.’   (NA PRO: MAF 459/40, 1986).    It sought to pursue a middle 
course between the conflicting interests and in that sense it was a greater political 
success than Zuckerman, although whether it represented effective policy is another 
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matter.    The archival evidence shows that in some respects civil servants were 
uncomfortable with what eventually emerged.   Despite their reservations, it served its 
purpose in ensuring a basis for policy for the next ten years that evoked less 
controversy than the preceding policy. 
Defusing the issue: the Badger Panel 
Creating spaces where the views of opposing stakeholders can be exposed to expert 
evidence, mediated and hopefully reconciled is one technique available to government 
for dealing with an intractable policy problem .   The Badger Panel was set up in 1976 
‘for the express purpose of providing a forum for the views and advice of leading 
experts and interested organisations on the problems posed by bovine tuberculosis in 
badgers.   The membership … includes a wide range of scientific, veterinary and 
conservation interests and individuals’.   (NA PRO: MAF 458/26, 1984, 1).    As an 
advisory body, it is evident that their effect on policy was limited, in part because 
‘Given the wide spectrum of opinion represented on the Badger Panel it has 
frequently not been easy to achieve a unified view.’  (NA PRO, MAF 459/37, 1986b).   
When an independent chairman was appointed, it was noted that the ‘main need in 
guiding Panel’s operations will be to try and achieve compromise so can offer unified 
advice to Government.’  (NA PRO: MAF 459/16, 1987c).  In reply to an enquiry 
about whether the Ministry ever took a more liberal or cautious line than an advisory 
committee recommended, it was stated: 
           The [Badgers Panel] periodically churns out recommendations to the Minister. 
           Adoption is by no means certain but they also get a polite hearing.   Given the 
           political flavour of conservationist views it is hard to know in which direction 
           liberal lies.   Farmers think we are too liberal and conservationists too 
           draconian.  Can’t win really.  A classic piece of Ministry fence sitting at the 
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           moment.   (NA PRO: MAF 459/66, 1991). 
          MAFF was well aware that the panel performed a very valuable function in 
terms of explaining its own policies and legitimising policy: 
           At present the Panel’s support for the Ministry’s policy in this emotionally 
           sensitive area is most valuable as a means of putting our views to organisations 
           that might be critical or hostile.   Secondly, its existence enables the Minister 
           to say that his policy is continuously monitored by all of the organisations who 
           have a legitimate interest in the issues arising and thereby constitutes a  
           powerful political weapon.   (NA PRO: MAF 458/26, 1984, 2) 
          The Panel ‘plays a major role in allowing us to demonstrate that all shades of 
opinion on badgers have been taken into account before we kill them.’  (NA PRO, 
MAF 459/66, 1992b)    The seriousness with which the political cover it provided was 
taken is illustrated by the presence of a number of senior MAFF officials at meetings 
and the effort that went into briefing the chairman before meetings.    There was also a 
wish to secure as encompassing a membership as possible.    Officials did consider at 
one point whether the panel was too large but ‘all the organisations represented at 
present have a legitimate interest and there would likely to be a strong reaction from 
any excluded organisation which would outweigh the possible benefits of a smaller 
Panel.’  (NA PRO: MAF 459/17, 1986a)   The most difficult decision MAFF faced 
about membership was when the National Federation of Badger Groups was formed 
in 1986 and asked to be represented on the Badger Panel, leading to a meeting with 
officials: 
          Their representatives proved to be well informed and more moderate in their 
          views than might have been expected and the NFBG could be expected to play 
          a reasonably constructive role on the Panel.   There would, of course, also be a 
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          political advantage in such an appointment.    On the negative side, the NFBG 
          is a very new organisation whose durability must be in some doubt.  However, 
          the NFBG are the only body who can claim to represent the “badger lobby” 
          and, on balance, officials believe they should be invited to put forward a  
          nominee for appointment (NA PRO, MAF 459/17, 1986b, 4) 
          The first representative of the NFBG on the Panel proved to be somewhat 
outspoken, but his successor caused even more qualms.   The chairman of the panel 
‘recognised that Mr Hancock [sic] was likely to be a difficult member, given his 
previous views.’   (NA PRO: MAF, 459/65, 1990).   Mr Hancox resigned in 1992 
complaining that discussion in the Panel was ‘an insult to the intelligence and political 
integrity of those taking part’, that ‘he was not willing to be a political pawn’ and 
‘have had little support from Badger Groups’.   (NA PRO: MAF 459/66, 1992c).   
MAFF also had difficulties with the British Veterinary Association (BVA), which had 
been a stalwart supporter of its policies, but where an internal dispute broke out about 
whether they should be represented by a scientist or a practising vet.    The BVA 
telephoned to see whether MAFF might give a steer in favour of a large animal 
practice vet, but were told ‘I thought this unlikely as I did not think MAFF would 
want to influence organisations to such an extent.’   (NA PRO: MAF 459/65, 1989, 
2). 
       The Badger Panel ceased to meet after the establishment of the Krebs review in 
1996 and was disbanded in 2003.    The ostensible reason given was that it was no 
longer necessary as an expert group would supervise culling.  (Defra, 2003).    
However, it also reflected an attempt by Defra to construct a more evidence based 
approach to policy on bovine TB.  The strategy of creating encompassing groups 
which attempted to reconcile differences between highly divergent positions was seen 
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not to have worked and reliance was placed on much smaller, more exclusive groups.  
In 2006 Defra created a small TB Advisory Group which was set up to ‘consist of 
those with experience of working with the disease rather than a representative 
selection of interested organisations.   The group is not intended to provide another 
forum for the usual debates over badger culling to be rehearsed by farming and 
wildlife organisations’.   (Wilkinson, 2007, 11).   The inbuilt preference for veterinary 
expertise in this new arrangement was not necessarily a way of generating a workable 
solution as large animal vets tended to be sympathetic to their farmer clients and were 
inclined to see the problem in terms of the badger rather than cattle-to-cattle 
transmission.    ‘The use of veterinary advice is likely to cause further controversy … 
as their approach to disease control is frequently at odds with other forms of scientific 
expertise.’  (Wilkinson, 2007, 11).   In November 2008 Defra created a small Bovine 
TB eradication group which, apart from Defra officials, was composed just of farmers 
and veterinarians and was charged with developing a strategy to reduce the incidence 
of bovine TB.   It has been meeting once a fortnight. 
Conclusions 
Given that there is no ‘obvious workable policy option’ (Wilkinson, 2007, 15) it could 
be argued that having no settled or effective policy is the least bad outcome.    
However, this has to be balanced against a continuing deterioration in the incidence of 
the disease.   There were 2,639 new herd TB incidents in the first six months of 2008 
in Great Britain, as against 2,275 for the whole of 2007 and 18,793 reactors 
slaughtered as against 12,795 in 2007.    Current policy is not even containing the 
disease.  The Conservative Party has announced that if it achieves office it will 
embark on a strategy of culling badgers. 
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       There is a more radical policy option which would not be popular with the 
farming industry.   Even in countries like Australia which do not have a wildlife 
reservoir, eradication of the disease was very expensive.   It has to be accepted that 
the cost of eradicating TB would be far greater than either the government or the 
industry, or both of them together, would be willing to pay.  Indeed, it is doubtful if 
any animal diseases would have been eradicated historically if one had to mount a 
business case as current Defra policy-making procedures require.  One therefore could 
think in terms of a feasible containment strategy.    This would involve accepting that 
some areas of the country are lost to TB.     In practice, farmers in those areas already 
have to live with the disease, as interviews with farmers in Gloucestershire in 
February 2009 confirmed.    Resources would then be concentrated round the edge of 
infected areas to stop the spread of the disease to clean areas. 
       What are the main general lessons to be derived from this case study about policy 
failure?    First, there are limits to the extent to which the transformation of the state in 
Britain affected this particular political arena.  The replacement of MAFF by Defra 
produced a new approach to the problem which attempted to rely on evidence rather 
than political bargaining processes, but ‘the results have been highly contentious and 
many alternative truth claims have been made.’   (Wilkinson, 2007, 15).  More 
generally, it shows the constraints operating of efforts at depoliticisation in policy 
areas where evidence-based discourses do not predominate and hence points to some 
of the limits of the depoliticisation narrative which has been so predominant in recent 
explanations of British politics.    Indeed, rather than experts depoliticising the issue, 
what can be seen is a ‘politicisation of expertise.’  (Wilkinson, 2007, 15).    Moreover, 
the issue has now become one of controversy between the two main political parties.   
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        Yet this politicisation fails to take account of the way in which different forms of 
expertise may ‘frame’ the problem in different ways, in this case the differences 
between the perspectives of vets and epidemiologists.   In policy areas in which 
mythology, as in the case of old rogue badgers, and values and images permeate the 
policy process, mechanisms such as external enquiries do little to resolve the 
underlying conflicts.  MAFF resorted to traditional devices to manage the problem 
such as advisory committees and stakeholder forums, although their efforts were 
undermined by the unwillingness of one of the key stakeholders, the NFU, to support  
their policy in private but not in public.  The Badger Panel provided useful political 
cover for MAFF, but produced little common ground between the opposed interests. 
The lesson that Defra learned was that such broadly based forums were not going to 
reconcile strongly opposed interests, nor were they going to produce workable 
solutions.   Hence, Defra has pursued a stakeholder strategy which engages with a 
more limited range of key interests.   This could be interpreted as a process of policy 
learning, although there is recognition within Defra of the tension between working 
more effectively with a limited group of core stakeholders and being open to charges 
of exclusion.  
      One implication is that some account has been taken of the role of emotion in the 
policy process, the specification of blame and the generation of villains and the extent 
to which notions of injustice come into play.   (Japser, 1998).    Models derived from 
welfare economics with its technocratic perspective are unlikely to capture such 
factors.    What one needs is an understanding of how the policy problem is 
constructed, often from different assumptions that lead to divergent conclusions. 
Note 
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